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En janvier 2016, dans la décision de la Société de soutien à l’enfance et à la famille des 
Premières Nations du Canada (Société de soutien), le Tribunal canadien des droits de la 
personne a constaté que le gouvernement canadien avait effectué de la discrimination 
envers les enfants autochtones vivant dans les réserves, relativement à l’octroi de 
financement pour la protection de l’enfance autochtone et pour certains autres services. 
La décision Société de soutien porte sur le travail quotidien et générationnel nécessaire 
dans une société pour assurer la survie sociale, culturelle et économique. C’est ce que les 
économistes féministes appellent « reproduction sociale ». Cet article pose une question 
fondamentale quant à cette décision : devrait-on interpréter les principales questions 
constitutionnelles qu’elle soulève comme des contestations ou une crise relative à la 
provision de soins? 
 
In January 2016, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in First Nations Child and 
Family Caring Society of Canada v Canada (Caring Society) found that the Canadian 
government had discriminated against Indigenous children on reserve in its provision of 
funding for child welfare and certain other services. Caring Society is a case about the 
daily and generational work that is needed in any society to ensure social, cultural, and 
economic survival, or what feminist political economists call social reproduction. This 
article thus asks a central question of this decision: are the main constitutional issues it 
raises best understood as contests over, and crises of, care? 
 
THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE January 2016 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s (CHRT or the 
Tribunal) decision in First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada v Canada 
(Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development).
1
 In this landmark case, the CHRT found 
that the Canadian government had discriminated against First Nations
2
 children on reserve in its 
provision of funding for child welfare and certain other services.  
                                                        
*
Kate Bezanson, PhD is Associate Professor and Chair of the Sociology Department at Brock University. She is also 
a Constitutional Law LLM student at Osgoode. The author wishes to thank Ron Stevenson, Jana Promislow, 
Andrew Lokan, Jennifer Malabar, Brendan Miller, and Joanne Wright for their comments and insights on this topic 
and paper. 
1
 2016 CHRT 2 [Caring Society].  
2
 There is confusion and elision when it comes to the terms Aboriginal, First Nations, and Indigenous. In the 
decision under consideration in this paper, the term First Nations is used primarily as the Tribunal is referencing the 
provision of child welfare services in First Nations communities on reserve. The term Aboriginal is used in the 
decision and more generally with reference to its constitutional inclusion of First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples.  
In this paper and in keeping with international conventions, I use the term Indigenous as a collective referent for 
First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples where possible, but deploy the term First Nations in relation to matters 
related to child welfare on reserve.   
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Caring Society is, at its core, a case about what feminist political economists call social 
reproduction.
3
 At the broadest level, social reproduction refers to the daily and generational work 
that is needed in any society to ensure social, cultural, and economic survival.
4
 Law and social 
policy are frequently called upon to grapple with the “fleshy, messy, and indeterminate stuff of 
everyday life”
5
 that is social reproduction, yet often do so inadequately such that questions of 
culture, gender, racialization, income, and power are not well incorporated.
6
 In a post-Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission era, this case offers an opportunity to critically assess questions such 
as: what constitutes care, who pays for it, in what amounts, provided by whom, with which 
words, in which language, with what kind of memory, and in which kinds of families? It 
illuminates processes and sites of struggle, including at the macro level in social, legal, political, 
and economic legacies and dynamics of settler colonialism, neoliberalism, and federalism; at the 
meso level, in and among institutions, policies, state/agency/band/social work actors; and at the 
micro level, in the day-to-day (usually gendered and unpaid) transmission of culture, norms, 
socialization (including to racism) as well as love, support, and material/physical care.  
This article asks a central question of the Caring Society decision: are the main 
constitutional issues it raises (policy and funding jurisdiction/obligations and a sui generis 
relationship) best understood as contests over, and crises of, care? It proceeds in three stages. 
First, it reviews and contextualizes the CHRT ruling and subsequent compliance orders. Second, 
it suggests that since the inception of the First Nations Child and Family Services (FNCFS) 
Program in 1990, the struggle over child welfare on reserve has occurred concurrently with an 
escalating neoliberalization of social and economic policy. This neoliberalization process has 
dovetailed positively with greater community/First Nations based control of service provision, 
and negatively with a broader trend toward a downloading and individualizing of social risks. 
This neoliberalization occurred along with an expansion of a culture of accountability in a 
context that either reduced, or made increasingly conditional, the provision of material and social 
supports. Third, it applies the lens of social reproduction to the case, showing how the conflicts 
                                                        
3
 Nancy Fraser, “Contradictions of Capital and Care” (2016) 100 New Left Rev 99; Kate Bezanson, “Return of the 
Nightwatchman State? Federalism, Social Reproduction and Social Reproduction in Conservative Canada” in Katie 
Meehan & Kendra Strauss, eds, Precarious Worlds: Contested Geographies of Social Reproduction (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2015) 25 [Bezanson, “Return of the Nightwatchman State?”]; Isabella Bakker, “Social 
Reproduction and the Constitution of a Gendered Political Economy” (2007) 12:4 New Political Economy 541; 
Shirin M. Rai & Georgina Waylen, eds, New Frontiers in Feminist Political Economy (Abindgon, UK: Routledge, 
2014); Diane Elson, “Economic Crises from the 1980s to the 2010s: A Gender Analysis” in Shirin M. Rai & 
Georgina Waylen, eds, New Frontiers in Feminist Political Economy (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2014) 189. 
4
 Kate Bezanson, “Mad Men Social Policy: Families, Social Reproduction, and Childcare in a Conservative Canada” 
in Rachel Langford, Susan Prentice & Patrizia Albanese, eds, Caring for Children: Social Movements and Public 
Policy in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2017) 19 [Bezanson, “Mad Men Social 
Policy”]; Antonella Picchio, Social Reproduction: The Political Economy of the Labour Market (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992).  
5
 Cindy Katz, “Vagabond Capitalism and the Necessity of Social Reproduction” (2001) 33:4 Antipode 709 at 711.  
6
 While areas such as family law and income assistance may be the most obvious instances of the intersections of a 
social reproduction analysis and law, this theoretical lens has broad and pressing application including in relation to 
land and title claims for Indigenous peoples. For example, in the ground-breaking case Tsilhqot’in Nation v British 
Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 [Tsilhqot’in], the Supreme Court considered robust anthropological, historical, and oral 
history accounts of cultural practices and land usages. This evidence, while sufficient to unanimously grant 
Aboriginal title, missed a crucial nuance that norms, habits, practices, customs, and languages are transmitted via 
(often gendered) individual, family, and group practices, and are eroded when the conditions of social reproduction 
are directly or indirectly undermined, and importantly, are not fixed but adaptive and thus change over time.   
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over social reproduction are shifted: among levels and branches of government and crystallized 
in the misapplication of Jordan’s Principle;
7
 among child welfare service providers, agencies, 
and agents; and within families, communities, and foster care providers. The lens of social 
reproduction here illuminates both the multi-scalar and multigenerational effects of neo-
colonialism and its practices, and a potential for law and social policy to attend to its limits and 
failures. It concludes by suggesting that Caring Society reflects profound substantiated claims for 
equality,
8
 material redress and recognition, with implications for the goal of reconciliation.  
 
I. CARING SOCIETY V CANADA 
 
Although the Tribunal issued its decision in early 2016, Caring Society remains only partially 
finished. The initial complaint was filed in 2007, and was referred by the Canadian Human 
Rights Commission to the CHRT in 2008.
9
 In 2012, the Federal Court
10
 set aside the CHRT’s
11
 
2011 dismissal of the complaint on jurisdictional grounds, and in 2013 the Federal Court of 
Appeal dismissed the government’s appeal of that decision.
12
 A newly constituted CHRT panel 
was formed in 2012, and it ruled that the complaint would be heard. Allegations of retaliation 
were added to the complaint in 2012, and in June 2015, the CHRT panel found the allegations of 
                                                        
7
 Jordan’s Principle is a “child-first” principle that requires that whomever is contacted first (provincial/federal 
government or department) pays for a public service that is available to children in that province, and reimbursement 
is sorted out later. See Caring Society, supra note 2 at para 351. 
8
 In studying this and related cases, I have wondered why this claim was brought to this tribunal rather than as a 
section 15 Charter case. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (UK), 
1982, c 11, s 15. There are benefits and drawbacks to this important case having been heard at the Canadian Human 
Rights Tribunal. The benefits of a tribunal include lower costs, greater accessibility, greater flexibility in evidence 
rules and procedures, ostensibly time efficiencies, specialization in human rights jurisprudence, and some evidence 
(though no consensus) that the test for discrimination may be met more easily under the Canadian Human Rights 
Act than under section 15 of the Charter. See e.g. Claire Mummé, “At the Crossroads in Discrimination Law: How 
the Human Rights Codes Overtook the Charter in Canadian Government Services Cases” (2012) 9 JL & Equality 
103. It is also worth noting that the repeal of section 67 of the Canadian Human Rights Act in 2008 meant that, as of 
2010, federal and First Nations governments were no longer shielded from discrimination complaints. Section 67 
read: “nothing in this Act affects any provision of the Indian Act or any provision made under or pursuant to that 
Act.” See An Act to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act, SC 2008, c 30. Among the most important detriments 
is that the results of a case at the Human Rights Tribunal level are not binding on courts, though notice is generally 
taken of such findings. See Robert J Sharpe & Kent Roach, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Irwin 
Press, 2013) at 16. The Caring Society case is thus not directly in conversation with developments in other areas of 
constitutional case law involving Indigenous peoples in Canada, nor are the substantive equality issues it raises 
given a formal voice in reconciliatory dialogues flowing from such cases. 
9
 The Canadian Human Rights Commission hears complaints related to discrimination under the Canadian Human 
Rights Act, has a process of investigation, offers mediation where possible, and where not possible, refers cases to 
the CHRT for consideration. The CHRT conducts formal hearings and renders decisions based on evidence and 
relevant law. See Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, online: <chrt-tcdp.gc.ca/index-en.html> [perma.cc/F6FP-
PMRY].   
10
 Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Canada (AG), 2012 FC 445 [Caring Society FC]. 
11
  First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada and Assembly of First Nations v Attorney General of 
Canada (representing the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2011 CHRT 4. 
12
 Canada (AG) v Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2013 FCA 75 [Caring Society FCA]; Caring Society, supra 
note 2 at para 8. 
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retaliation to be partially substantiated.
13
 The CHRT hearing on the complaint commenced in 
early 2013 and formally ended in late 2014, but the CHRT retains jurisdiction until orders are 
implemented. Since its decision was issued in January of 2016, Indigenous and Northern Affairs 
Canada (INAC)
14 
has been found to be in violation of portions of the orders in the original ruling 
and three compliance orders have been issued.
15
 Although the spring 2016 federal budget 
increased spending to FNCFS, additional new funding was announced in the summer of 2016, 
and a motion was unanimously passed in the House of Commons in November supporting 
compliance with the CHRT ruling, the complainants’ submission to the CHRT in December 
2016 alleging a continued failure to comply fully with orders related to this case suggests that 
these measures are inadequate.
16
 Despite its initial claim that it would not seek judicial review of 
the ruling,
17
 the most recent non-compliance order, issued May 26, 2017, was appealed by the 
Government of Canada on June 23
rd
, and later repealed.
18
  
The issues raised in this decision and the difficulties in compliance with its orders reflect 
both the complexity of the policy questions addressed and the insufficiency of legal processes to 
adequately redress materially or symbolically the weight of internally colonialist historical 
legacies. The policy questions are complex because child and family services is an area of social 
policy that addresses sometimes supportive, sometimes life-altering, and sometimes life-
threatening issues ranging from counselling support, to domestic violence, to removal of a child 
from a family home. The policy questions are also complex because although Aboriginal Affairs 
                                                        
13
 First Nations Child & Family Caring Society of Canada et al v Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of 
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), 2015 CHRT 14. 
14
 Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada (INAC or IAND) was renamed AANDC in 2011, and then 
changed to Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) in 2015. See Zi-Ann Lum, “Liberals’ Indigenous 
Affairs Name Change Called ‘Important’ Symbolic Gesture”, Huffington Post (4 November 2015), online: 
<huffingtonpost.ca/2015/11/04/aboriginal-affairs-name-change_n_8475496.html> [perma.cc/RQ5M-8GEA]. In this 
paper, I refer to Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), its name when the Caring Society decision was 
issued, where possible. In August 2017, INAC was dissolved and two ministries—Indigenous Services (“responsible 
for providing services for non-self-governing communities”) and Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern 
Affairs—were created. See Kathleen Harris, “Trudeau Remakes Indigenous Affairs Ministry, Adds 2 Rookies to 
Cabinet”, CBC News (28 August 2017), online: <cbc.ca/news/politics/seamus-oregan-veterans-affairs-minister-
1.4264773>. 
15
 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al v Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of 
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), 2016 CHRT 10 [Caring Society 2016 CHRT 10]; First Nations Child and 
Family Caring Society of Canada et al v Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada), 2016 CHRT 16; First Nations Child & Family Caring Society of Canada et al v Attorney General 
of Canada (representing the Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada), 2017 CHRT 14. 
16
 Canada, Ministry of Finance, Budget 2016: Growing the Middle Class (Ottawa: Ministry of Finance, 2016) at 
139; Canada, Government of Canada, “Joint Statement from the Minister of Health and the Minister of Indigenous 
and Northern Affairs on Responding to Jordan's Principle” (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 25 July 2016). See 
House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 102 (1 November 2016) at 14:35. Motion 296 in support of 
Jordan’s Principle also passed unanimously in the House of Commons in 2007. See House of Commons, Votes and 
Proceedings, 39th Parl, 2nd Sess, No 27 (12 December 2007). The December submissions filed by the Caring 
Society, the Assembly of First Nations, and the Nishnawbe Aski Nation related specifically to the failure to 
implement the orders in Caring Society 2016 CHRT 10, supra note 15 at para 33 relating to Jordan’s Principle.   
17
 CBC News, “Federal Government Won't Appeal Ruling that Found it Discriminated Against Children on 
Reserves”, CBC News (22 February 2016), online: <cbc.ca/news/politics/federal-government-not-appeal-children-
reserves-1.3458969>. 
18
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and Northern Development Canada (AANDC at the time, later changed to INAC)
19
 funds 
services delivered by agencies or provincial/territorial governments, it does not directly provide 
those services. Additionally, child and family services necessarily exist within a range of related 
human services such as health and education, which are governed and administered under 
provincial/territorial jurisdiction. The interplay of agencies, branches, and levels of government 
results in confusion about responsibility and at times, denial of service. Importantly to this case, 
the level and quality of services and supports, both directly within the purview of the federal 
government’s FNCFS Program, and complementary to it, have been found to be woefully 
insufficient by numerous external experts for many years.
20
  
The central question in Caring Society was whether, under section 5 of the Canadian 
Human Rights Act,
21
 AANDC/INAC discriminated on the basis of race and/or national/ethnic 
origin in its provision of child and family services on reserve.
22
 The complainants, the First 
Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada (Caring Society) and the Assembly of First 
Nations (AFN), alleged that AANDC/INAC provided “inequitable and insufficient funding”
23
 
for child and family services. The Tribunal found:  
 
AANDC is involved in the provision of child and family services to First Nations on 
reserves and in the Yukon; that First Nations are adversely impacted by the provision 
of those services by AANDC, and, in some cases, denied those services as a result of 
AANDC’s involvement; and; that race and/or national or ethnic origin are a factor in 




The Tribunal concluded that “these adverse impacts perpetuate the historical disadvantage and 
trauma suffered by Aboriginal people, in particular as a result of the Residential Schools 
system.”
25
 It ordered that AANDC/INAC cease “its discriminatory practices and reform the First 
Nations Child and Family Services (FNCFS) Program,”
26
 and to “cease applying its narrow 
definition of Jordan’s Principle and to take measures to immediately implement the full meaning 
and scope of the principle.”
27
  
                                                        
19
 See supra note 14 regarding the recent splitting of INAC into two ministries. 
20
 See John Loxley, Fred Wien & Cindy Blackstock, Bridging Econometrics and First Nations Child and Family 
Service Agency Funding: Phase One Report (Vancouver: First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada, 
2004); Cindy Blackstock et al, Wen:de: We Are Coming to the Light of Day (Ottawa: First Nations Child and Family 
Caring Society of Canada, 2005); John Loxley et al, Wen:de: The Journey Continues (Ottawa: First Nations Child 
and Family Caring Society of Canada, 2005); Auditor General of Canada, May 2008 Report of the Auditor General 
of Canada to the House of Commons, Chapter 4, First Nations Child and Family Services Program—Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2008) [AG Canada 
2008 Report]; Auditor General of Canada, 2011 Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of 
Commons, Chapter 4, Programs for First Nations on Reserves (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government 
Services Canada, 2011) [AG Canada 2011 Report]. 
21
 Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6 [CHRA]. 
22
 Caring Society, supra note 2 at para 6.  
23
 Ibid.  
24
 Caring Society, supra note 2 at para 28.  
25
 Ibid at para 459. 
26
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In determining that there was a prima facie (on its face, or assumed to be true unless 
proven otherwise) case of discrimination, the Tribunal considered issues of jurisdiction, 
definitions and quality of service provision, and more broadly, the Crown’s constitutional and 
fiduciary duty with Indigenous peoples.
28
 These aspects of this decision merit deeper 
consideration.  
 
A. JURISDICTION AND SERVICE 
 
Because this complaint falls under section 5 of the CHRA, questions of jurisdiction and service—
who pays for and delivers what—were central features of this case.
 29
 
                                                        
28
 The issue of requiring comparator evidence to substantiate a claim of discrimination under human rights 
legislation was extensively considered by the Tribunal. AANDC/INAC argued that because no evidence was 
provided by the complainants pertaining to provincial/territorial budgets and funding models, it was not possible to 
conclude that discrimination occurred and amounted to perceived differences, rather than substantiated ones. This 
argument was rejected by the Federal Court, the Federal Court of Appeal, and the CHRT. See Caring Society FC, 
supra note 10; Caring Society FCA, supra note 12; and First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et 
al v Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), 2012 CHRT 17. The 
Federal Court, following Withler v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC 12 [Withler], noted that a requirement of a mirror 
comparator group in every case would mean that “First Nations people will be limited in their ability to seek the 
protection of the Act [CHRA] if they believe that they have been discriminated against in the provision of a 
government service on the basis of their race or national or ethnic origin.” See Caring Society FC, supra note 10 at 
para 337. The Federal Court of Appeal extended this analysis, following Moore v British Columbia (Education), 
2012 SCC 61 [Moore] and Quebec (AG) v A, 2013 SCC 5 [Quebec v A], suggesting that substantive equality is 
imperiled if the existence of a comparator group is accepted as determinative in a finding of discrimination. See 
Caring Society FCA, supra note 12 at para 18. Recalling Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia (1989) 1 SCR 
143 at 164, the Tribunal cautioned against a formalistic approach to equality: “every difference in treatment between 
individuals under the law will not necessarily result in inequality and, as well, that identical treatment may 
frequently produce serious inequality.” The Tribunal challenged AANDC/INAC’s assertion that no comparator 
evidence had been presented, and delineated at paragraphs 329 to 339 submissions that supported a discrimination 
finding in funding and service provision on and off reserve. See Caring Society, supra note 2.  
29
 Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was recently granted in March 2017 for a CHRT case raising similar issues. 
See Canadian Human Rights Commission v Canada (AG), 2016 FCA 200 [CHRC v Canada]. It seeks clarity on 
whether specific discriminatory federal legislation must be challenged via the Charter rather than as a human rights 
complaint, potentially shifting cases such as Caring Society outside of the purview of the CHRT. CHRC v Canada 
concerns the applications of two different parties in two separate CHRT cases (Andrews et al v Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada, 2013 CHRT 21 [Andrews]; and Matsen et al v Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2013 CHRT 13 
[Matsen])  regarding status under the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5. Ruling on both simultaneously, the Federal Court 
and the Federal Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the Matsen and Andrews decisions on the grounds of 
reasonableness. See Canadian Human Rights Commission v Attorney General of Canada, 2015 FC 398; CHRC v 
Canada. CHRC v Canada is pertinent for Caring Society because it has the potential to clarify the Court’s view on 
cases where: (1) a service may not available to the general public (a claim made by Canada in Caring Society, supra 
note 2); (2) what constitutes a service is in question; and (3) whether discrimination in a legislative scheme is the 
purview of a tribunal or if it should be subject to a potentially more rigorous section 1 Charter test. This case is thus 
an opportunity for the Court to provide guidance on whether the CHRA (a statute with quasi-constitutional status) 
can be used to challenge “denials of government benefits that are based on discriminatory criteria written into 
federal legislation.”
 
See Memorandum of Argument in support of the application for Leave to Appeal of the 
Applicant, the Canadian Human Rights Commission, in CHRC v Canada at para 1. In relation to the Caring Society 
case, CHRC v Canada may provide guidance on the questions that the Caring Society decision hinged on, that is 
whether funding is a service and what constitutes a service customarily available to the general public. However, 
while taking note of the significant similarity in questions raised, the Caring Society case does not involve a denial 
of benefits because of legislated eligibility criteria. Moreover, the provinces and territories, unlike the federal 
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Section 5 of the CHRA reads:  
 
It is a discriminatory practice in the provision of goods, services, facilities or 
accommodation customarily available to the general public 
   (a) to deny, or to deny access to, any such good, service, facility or 
accommodation to any individual, or 
   (b) to differentiate adversely in relation to any individual,  
 on a prohibited ground of discrimination.30 
 
Establishing provision and/or denial of services along with adverse differentiation required a 
finding that AANDC/INAC provided a service and not simply funding. Under section 91(24) of 
the Constitution Act, 1867, child welfare services for First Nations children and families living 
on reserve and in the Yukon are funded by AANDC/INAC via the FNCFS Program.
31
 These 
services are provided by provincially mandated First Nations Child and Family Services 
Agencies, and to a lesser extent, by provinces and non-Aboriginal service providers. Child 
welfare is, however, governed by provincial legislation and standards. 
Following Kelso v The Queen and Bitonti v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British 
Columbia, the Tribunal found that funding can constitute a service, citing from Kelso that “the 
government’s right to allocate resources cannot override a statute such as the Canadian Human 
Rights Act.”
 32
 Further, it concluded that the on reserve child and family services benefit provided 
by AANDC/INAC constitutes much more than funding. The more-than-funding relationship, 
which is in many ways at the heart of the discriminatory practice, involves policy directives and 
funding agreements.   
Different policy regimes govern First Nations child and family service agencies. Under 
the FNCFS Program, two primary funding approaches exist: Directive 20-1 applies in British 
Columbia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, and the Yukon Territory; and the 
Enhanced Prevention Focused Approach (EPFA) applies in Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec, 
Saskatchewan, and Prince Edward Island.
33
 A unique cost-sharing agreement between Ontario 
and AANDC/INAC—the 1965 Indian Welfare Agreement—provides for child and family 
services on First Nations reserves.
34
 The funding approaches—their form and amount of 
funding—hem and shape the services provided to First Nations children and families on reserve 
and in the Yukon Territory. They shape practice.
35
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
government, do have legislative and regulatory frameworks governing child welfare; federal child welfare funding 
aims to provide comparable levels of, and compliance with, sub-national programs. Thus, the outcome of CHRC v 
Canada may not apply tidily to Caring Society.   
30
 Supra note 21, s 5.  
31
 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5, s 91(24) [Constitution 
Act, 1867].  
32
 Kelso v The Queen, [1981] 1 SCR 199 [Kelso]; Bitonti et al v College of Physicians and Surgeons of British 
Columbia et al, 1999 BCHRT 63; Caring Society, supra note 2 at para 42. 
33
 Prior to 2007, when the complaint was first filed with the Canadian Human Rights Commission, Directive 20-1 
governed all provinces (save Ontario) and the Yukon (Caring Society, supra note 2 at para 44). Since then, some 
have transitioned to the EPFA. 
34
 Similar agreements are also in place in Alberta, British Columbia, and the Yukon. See Caring Society, supra note 
2 at para 46.  
35
 Blackstock et al, supra note 20 at 21. 
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These policy regimes have significant and longstanding problems, extensively 
documented in joint AANDC/INAC/Assembly of First Nations/FNCFS agency reports, 
independent reports by the Auditor General of Canada, and House of Commons Standing 
Committee reports since 2000.
36
 These reports find that the principal objective of the FNCFS 
Program, which is “to assist First Nations in providing access to culturally sensitive child and 
family services in their communities, and to ensure that the services provided to them are 
comparable to those available to other provincial residents in similar circumstances,”
37
 including 
services that aim to “increase the ability and capacity of First Nations families to remain together 
and to support the needs of First Nations children in their parental homes and communities,”
38
 
has been consistently unrealized under the FNCFS Program. Even following joint and external 
review, the EPFA program that serves as a replacement agreement for Directive 20-1, retains its 
central flaws, although funding is increased. The Tribunal delineated the myriad shortcomings of 
Directive 20-1, the EPFA, and the Ontario agreement, including: inflexible funding formulas that 
are generally unresponsive to variance in community needs based on size or service demand and 
volume; cost of living freezes and a failure to adjust to inflation and current wage levels; 
inadequate funding in almost every social policy jurisdiction AANDC/INAC controls; limited or 
absent compliance with provincial/territorial standards and legislation; and a failure to fund legal 
counsel for band representation in child removal cases.
39
 
Three issues are particularly important to the finding of discrimination in service 
provision, and have racialized dimensions: first, AANDC/INAC’s funding structure incentivizes 
removing children and placing them into care rather than focusing on prevention and support; 
second, AANDC/INAC has interpreted Jordan’s Principle narrowly, resulting in service delays 
and denials to First Nations children in care; and third, there is inadequate coordination and 
support between the FNCFS Program, the suite of other social programs AANDC/INAC offers, 
and other social and human services. 
In the first instance, the Tribunal found that insufficient fixed budgets for prevention and 
family support, and a schema of full cost, dollar-for-dollar reimbursement for taking children 
into care, created a distortion that made it financially and practically more feasible to remove 
children from their homes as a first course of action rather than as the last option explored.
40
 Off 
reserve, provincial child welfare policies follow best practices models that prioritize the best 
                                                        
36
 See Loxley, Wien & Blackstock, supra note 20; Blackstock et al, supra note 20; Loxley et al, supra note 20; AG 
Canada 2008 Report, supra note 20; AG Canada 2011 Report, supra note 20; Dr. Rose-Alma J. McDonald et al, 
First Nations Child and Family Services Joint National Policy Review Final Report (Ottawa: Assembly of First 
Nations and Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 2000); House of Commons, Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts, Chapter 4, First Nations Child and Family Services Program – Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada of the May 2008 Report of the Auditor General (March 2009) (Chair: Shawn Murphy) 
[House of Commons 2009 Report]; INAC, Government of Canada Response to the Report of the Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts on Chapter 4, First Nations Child and Family Services Program – Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada of the May 2008 Report of the Auditor General (August 2009), online: 
<ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/40-2/PACP/report-7/response-8512-402-43> [perma.cc/DS23-QNGG].  
37
 INAC, Fact Sheet – First Nations Child and Family Services (October 2006) at 1, cited in Caring Society, supra 
note 2 at para 67. 
38
 INAC, First Nations Child and Family Services – National Program Manual (May 2005) at 6, cited in Caring 
Society, supra note 2 at para 52. 
39
 Caring Society, supra note 2 at paras 122–148, 157, 217, 289, 306, 384, 387, 485.  
40
 Ibid at paras 168, 258, 344. 
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interests of the child and the least disruptive measure as a guiding objective.
41
 The objective of 
the FNCFS Program—culturally appropriate child and family services that are comparable to 
those provided off reserve—was not here met; moreover, this outcome has been well 
documented in joint AANDC/INAC reports since at least 2000.
42
 Here, the provision of funding 
facilitated a model of service delivery discordant with the practices and regulations of provincial 
child welfare; adverse effects were generated linked to race and/or national or ethnic origin. 




In the second instance, the Tribunal found that the narrow interpretation that 
AANDC/INAC applied to Jordan’s Principal meant delays and denials of service for First 
Nations children. Jordan’s Principle is:  
 
a child-first principle and provides that where a government service is available to all 
other children and a jurisdictional dispute arises between Canada and a 
province/territory, or between departments in the same government regarding 
services to a First Nations child, the government department of first contact pays for 
the service and can seek reimbursement from the other government/department after 
the child has received the service.  It is meant to prevent First Nations children from 




Inter-governmental disputes over funding (most of which are between federal departments) can 
result in delays, denials, and children being put into care in order to access services, especially 
where there are complex medical or care needs.
45
 The Federal Court in Pictou Landing Band 
Council v Canada (Attorney General) found the approach taken by AANDC/INAC and Health 
Canada to be exceedingly narrow, in that case for failing to reimburse a band council for in-
home health care that would have been available under provincial social assistance policy.
46
 
Pictou Landing and the CHRT decision considered here underscore the importance of the final 
issue outlined below: the failure to coordinate among departments and services, both within 
AANDC/INAC and more generally as a matter of policy. The CHRT agreed with the Federal 
Court in Pictou Landing when it suggested that “Jordan’s Principle is not an open-ended 
principle. It requires complimentary social or health service be legally available to persons off 




The issue of coordination and access to services goes beyond the purview of the FNCFS 
Program. In a context where AANDC/INAC is not in compliance with child welfare provincial 
standards, regulations, and funding, a watertight compartments approach (the FNCFS Program 
funds x but not y) bureaucratizes a complex social problem. Comprehensive approaches and best 
practices in child welfare at provincial levels include incorporating a range of social supports 
                                                        
41
 Ibid at para 342. 
42
 Ibid at paras 150, 341–342, 347, 383, 393. 
43
 Ibid at paras 62, 66, 72, 73, 111, 123, and 125 specifically related to incentivizing child removal from family 
homes.  
44
 Ibid at para 351 [emphasis in original].  
45
 Ibid at para 382.   
46
 Pictou Landing Band Council v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 342 [Pictou Landing]. 
47
 Ibid at para 116, cited in Caring Society, supra note 2 at para 378.   
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under the umbrella of these programs. AANDC/INAC’s assertion that funding is not a service 
thus does not absolve it from responsibility. A lack of coordination among departments/agencies 
and difficulty in accessing core and related services inform the finding of discrimination.  
 
B. FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS AND EQUALITY 
 
Caring Society confronted the issue of substantive equality.
48 
It found that First Nations children 
and families living on reserve were denied equal opportunity to child and family services 
available to others. This finding raises a final related issue: the Crown’s fiduciary relationship 
with Aboriginal peoples. 
As will be elucidated further in section three below, federalism and interjurisdictional 
disputes in social policy often involve shifting responsibility and blame for funding and action. 
In Caring Society, the Tribunal queried the claim by the respondent that fiduciary duty principles 
did not apply to this complaint.
49
 Following Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), the 
Tribunal affirmed that the delegation of funding rather than legislating under applicable federal 
statutes does not decrease AANDC/INAC’s constitutional responsibilities.
50
 The CHRT found 
that “AANDC’s commitment to ensuring the safety and well-being of children and families 
living on reserves and in Yukon must be considered in the context of the special relationship 
                                                        
48
 Although this article does not focus on this point, the question of the requirements for making out discrimination 
claims under human rights law is obviously critical. Legal scholars, and indeed Justice MacTavish in her Federal 
Court ruling on the Caring Society CHRT case, raise concerns about the section 15 test for discrimination creeping 
into human rights law. See Caring Society FC, supra note 10. In a careful review of the test for discrimination under 
human rights legislation and the Charter, Koshan argues that “the test for discrimination under human rights 
legislation should remain the traditional prima facie approach, unencumbered by extra requirements that may be 
imported via section 15 of the Charter.” Among the reasons Koshan cites for her conclusion is access to justice, 
noting that section 15 requirements impose a greater burden with “real financial, temporal, and outcome-based 
consequences for the claimant pursuing a discrimination claim.” See Jennifer Koshan, “Under the Influence: 
Discrimination Under Human Rights Legislation and Section 15 of the Charter” (2014) 3:1 Can J of Human Rights 
115 at 139, 140–41 [footnotes omitted]. See also Wayne MacKay, “The Marriage of Human Rights Codes and 
Section 15 of the Charter in Pursuit of Equality: A Case for Greater Separation in Both Theory and Practice” (2013) 
64 UNBLJ 54 at 97. Réaume extends this analysis, suggesting that “section 15 places the burden on the claimant to 
prove that the legislation does indulge in stereotyping, whereas under the conventional approach to human rights 
adjudication … the burden falls on respondents to prove that their generalizations are accurate.” See Leslie Réaume, 
“Postcards from O’Malley: Reinvigorating Statutory Human Rights Jurisprudence in the Age of the Charter” (2012) 
9 JL & Equality 67 at 68–69. Mummé situates the tension—supplanting the O’Malley (prima facie) standard with 
the formerly Law, now Kapp section 15 framework—as one in which constitutional analysis is adopted in order to 
build room for deference to state decision making (see Ontario Human Rights Commission v Simpsons-Sears Ltd 
[1985] 2 SCR 536 [O’Malley]; Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497 [Law]; 
and R v Kapp [2008] 2 SCR 483 [Kapp]). Mummé raises questions about whether there is, or should be, a division 
of labour between codes and the Charter (supra note 8 at 151). These conversations bear on the Caring Society case, 
and others like it, moving forward for a number of reasons. Beyond financial and expediency considerations, there is 
some support for the idea that the prima facie test for discrimination in a human rights setting is less burdensome to 
meet than the section 15 test. The evidentiary flexibility of a tribunal and its scope in remedies are also important 
reasons for seeking redress in this venue. Section 15 requirements, imported ad hoc into human rights settings, dilute 
these benefits without necessarily adding either the clarity a proportionality test affords or setting broad precedent 
about how equality would be satisfied.  
49
 Caring Society, supra note 2 at para 88.  
50
 Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR 624 [Eldridge]; Caring Society, supra note 2 at 
para 83. 
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between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples;”
51
 thus it must, following Haida Nation v British 
Columbia (Minister of Forests) (Haida Nation),
52
 act honourably. This sui generis
53 
relationship 
is not limited to section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
54
 The duty of the Crown and fiduciary 
relationships more generally have often been applied to cases involving land, which this case 
does not.
55
 The Tribunal, following Frame v Smith, contended that a fiduciary duty could extend 
to human and personal interests.
56
 Thus in this case, the Aboriginal interests relate not to land but 
to culture and language, and the transmission of these generationally. These interests find 
support in the Supreme Court decisions R v Coté and Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister 
of Education).
57
 Here, the potentially adversely affected interest is socio-cultural. Mingling 
discrimination claims and fiduciary duty, the Tribunal’s ruling suggests that AANDC/INAC put 
its budgetary and other interests ahead of those receiving support from the FNCFS Program and 
thus met neither its fiduciary responsibilities nor provided equitable and sufficient support to 
First Nations children on reserve and in the Yukon. 
Relatedly, the issues raised in this decision regarding comparability or similarity of 
circumstances show that despite their importance in human rights law, they may be limited 
lenses with which to consider questions of equality in unique relationships between states and 
historically subjected peoples. The normative liberal ideals of equality have a hollow translation 
in social policy terms when applied to the sui generis relationship between governments and 
Indigenous peoples.  
 
II. FROM NEOLIBERALIZATION TO AUSTERITY IN SOCIAL 
POLICY 
 
                                                        
51
 Supra note 2 at para 87. 
52
 2004 SCC 73 [Haida Nation]. 
53
 Significantly overlapping with Charter issues of substantive equality, Caring Society considered and recognized 
the sui generis relationship of First Nations peoples in Canada, extending the Supreme Court’s analysis in Moore, 
Withler, and Quebec v A that a mirror comparator group is not always needed or even useful. In Moore, the Court 
reiterated that insistence on a mirror comparator group would subvert substantive equality and “risks perpetuating 
the very disadvantage and exclusion from mainstream society the [Human Rights] Code is intended to remedy,” 
concluding that the focus must not be on comparator groups, but “whether there is discrimination, period.” In 
Quebec v A, Abella J for the majority confirmed that “a mirror comparator group analysis may fail to capture 
substantive equality, may become a search for sameness, may shortcut the second stage of the substantive equality 
analysis, and may be difficult to apply.” See Moore, supra note 28 at paras 30–31, 60; Quebec v A, supra note 28 at 
para 346; and Withler, supra note 28. 
54
 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 35. 
55
 See R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507; R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075; Guerin v the Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 
335; Tsilhqot’in, supra note 6; Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2002 SCC 79 [Wewaykum]. 
56
 Frame v Smith, [1987] 2 SCR 99 [Frame]; Caring Society, supra note 2 at paras 99–101. 
57
 R v Côté, [1996] 3 SCR 139; Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] 3 SCR 3. At 
paragraph 104, the Tribunal in Caring Society found that the three criteria were met under the common law test for a 
fiduciary duty from Elder Advocates Society, namely: (1) the fiduciary can exercise some power or discretion; (2) it 
can exercise this discretion in a way that affects the recipient’s interests; and (3) the recipient is vulnerable to the 
fiduciary holding power. See Alberta v Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24 at para 27. The 
respondents, in their factum and oral arguments in Caring Society, argued that because the interest asserted was not 
a land interest as in Wewaykum, there was no fiduciary duty owed (see Wewaykum, supra note 55 at para 81, cited in 
Caring Society, supra note 2 at para 96).  
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The FNCFS Program was introduced in 1990. Beginning in earnest in the mid-1990s, the next 
two decades were marked by significant tumult in Canadian social policy writ large; Canadian 
social policy was subject to reform, retrenchment, instrumentalized investments, and austerity 
measures.
58
 In the 1990s in areas of federal jurisdiction, such as Employment Insurance and 
transfers to provinces under a revamped cost-sharing arrangement for health, education, and 
social services called the Canada Health and Social Transfer, budgetary restrictions and 
heightened eligibility thresholds and criteria were introduced.
59
 Similarly, in 1995–96, a cap on 
spending limited growth in AANDC/INAC (then Indian Affairs) budgets for core programs 
(including child and family services) to 2 per cent per year.
60
 By way of example, eligibility for 
Employment Insurance decreased significantly after reforms were introduced in 1996, claimable 
amounts were reduced, and certain groups of claimants, particularly women, had difficulty 
qualifying under the new regime.
61
 A managerial model of service assessment and delivery—
sometimes called a new managerialism—was widely adopted in government and third 
sector/not-for-profit practice.
62
 This model is nested in a discourse of efficiency and borrows 
heavily from private sector management theory.
63
 It finds theoretical expression in a resurgence 
and recalibration of classical liberal theory, often called neoliberalism.  
The term neoliberalism is often imprecisely deployed to explain myriad practices and 
processes.
64
 It originated in what has been called the Chicago school of economics, and was 
popularized in the work of Milton Friedman and Freidrich von Hayek. Finding application first 
in Latin America in the 1970s, neoliberalism came to be adopted in structural adjustment lending 
policy conditions by international agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund in the 1980s, and in the policies and approaches of conservative governments in the United 
States under Ronald Reagan and in the UK under Margaret Thatcher.
65
 It became ubiquitous—
with variations and in hybridized forms—in most Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) nations in the 1990s, such that the approach came to be referred to as the 
                                                        
58
 See Jane Jenson, “Historical Transformation of Canada’s Social Architecture: Institutions, Instruments, and Ideas” 
in Keith Banting & John Myles, eds, Inequality and the Fading of Redistributive Politics (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2013) 43; Rianne Mahon, “Childcare, New Social Risks, and the New Politics of Redistribution in Ontario” in ibid, 
359. 
59
 See e.g. Marjorie Griffin Cohen & Jane Pulkingham, “Introduction: Going too Far? Feminist Public Policy in 
Canada” in Marjorie Griffin Cohen & Jane Pulkingham, eds, Public Policy for Women: The State, Income Security, 
and Labour Market Issues (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 3 at 19. 
60
 INAC Cost Drivers Study, From Poverty to Prosperity: Opportunities to Invest in First Nations Pre-Budget 
Submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, September 2007 (Ottawa: AFN, 2007) 
[INAC Cost Drivers Study] cited in Judith Rae, “Program Delivery Devolution: A Stepping Stone or Quagmire for 
First Nations?” (2009) 7:2 Indigenous LJ 1 at 27, n 107. 
61
 Martha MacDonald, “Income Security for Women: What About Employment Insurance?” in Cohen & 
Pulkingham, eds, supra note 59, 251 at 254–58. 
62
 John Shields & Bryan Mitchell Evans, Shrinking the State: Globalization and Public Administration “Reform” 
(Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1998) at 102.   
63
 See e.g. Bryan Evans, Ted Richmond & John Shields, "Structuring Neoliberal Governance: The Nonprofit Sector, 
Emerging New Modes of Control and the Marketisation of Service Delivery" (2005) 24:1 Policy and Society 73.  
64
 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: Zone Books, 2015); Jaime 
Peck, Nik Theodore & Neil Brenner, “Neoliberalism Resurgent?  Market Rule after the Great Recession” (2012) 
111:2 South Atlantic Q 265; Simon Springer, “Fuck Neoliberalism” (2016) 15:2 ACME: An Intl J for Critical 
Geographies 285. 
65
 See e.g. Kate Bezanson, Gender, the State and Social Reproduction: Household Insecurity in Neo-Liberal Times 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) at 25, 32 [Bezanson, Household Insecurity]. 
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 In economic terms, neoliberalism refers to a form of laissez-faire 
liberal capitalism in which markets are viewed as the best vehicle for all distribution, and 
social/regulatory conditions and limits (such as public assets and services) are viewed as 
distortions.
67
  Neoliberalism, however, is both economic theory and ideology; the latter is 
insidious as its features are internalized at the state/third sector/institutional level and in 
individual practice and belief. Some scholars thus use the term neoliberalization rather than 
neoliberalism to reflect the transfer of ideology to practice at market/state and individual levels.
68
 
Beyond terminological and conceptual shifts that redefine Keynesian citizens as neoliberal 
consumers, this merit-based economic philosophy views structural disadvantage as a result of 
individual failing. At the state and policy level, deregulation, increased financialization, 
privatization of public services and assets, a fiscally constrained state, and reforms aimed at 
disciplining and surveilling the poor take centre stage.
69
 Importantly, though, neoliberalism is not 
about deregulation; rather it is a re-regulation that prizes market-based competition and is 
cautious of redistribution via non-market means.   
The period preceding the economic crisis of 2008 was marked by a social policy current 
germane to the FNCFS Program: the rise of the social investment state in Canada and 
elsewhere.
70
 Departing from earlier Washington Consensus neoliberal approaches, this social 
investment perspective is one in which human capital and often anti-poverty promoting policies 
are developed by international agencies and third-way governments (usually centrist and centre-
left). It marks an often instrumental deployment of a softened neoliberalism in social policy. 
Strategic investment in certain social policy areas expanded from the mid-1990s to 2008 in many 
Canadian provinces/territories and at certain points federally. These expansions were usually tied 
to a specific new managerialism model.
71
 Strategic investment approaches often transfer social 
risks from society to the individual and tend to increase performance reporting requirements such 
as cost efficiency exercises or workfare-type policies (parts of neoliberal practice). Such 
practices often make all levels of government and agencies receiving funding leaner in both 
staffing and resources.
72
   
Two additional features of neoliberalism are particularly relevant to Caring Society. First, 
this form of economic liberalism and concomitant social practice is adaptable and versatile, 
despite its noted instability.
73
 Second, one of the features of neoliberal governance in Canada at 
federal, provincial/territorial, and municipal levels over the last twenty-five years has been a 
                                                        
66
 See e.g. Alfredo Saad-Filho, “Growth, Poverty and Inequality: From Washington Consensus to Inclusive Growth” 
(2010) United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs Working Paper No 100, online: 
<un.org/esa/desa/papers/2010/wp100_2010.pdf> [perma.cc/NM9L-47PV]. 
67
 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 64–65.  
68
 See Peck, Theodore & Brenner, supra note 64. 
69
 See Loïc Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Governance of Social Insecurity (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2009); Bezanson, Household Insecurity, supra note 65. 
70
 On social investment, see Jane Jenson, “The LEGO™ Paradigm and New Social Risks: Consequences for 
Children” in Jane Lewis, ed, Children, Changing Families and Welfare States (London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2006) 27. On financialization, see Malcolm Sawyer, “What is Financialization?” (2013) 42:4 Intl J of Political 
Economy 5 at 9. 
71
 See ibid; Mahon, supra note 58.  
72
 Banting & Myles, supra note 58 at 19. 
73
 For a good discussion of the 2008 economic crisis and its relationship to neoliberal capitalism, see Stephen 
McBride, Rianne Mahon & Gerard Boychuk, eds, After ’08: Social Policy and the Global Financial Crisis 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015). 
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general trend toward a centralized decentralization. Here, control and decision-making power 
over programs and services is often centralized to one level of government, but the day-to-day 
delivery is increasingly delegated to other levels of government, third-sector/not-for-profit 
agencies, or sold or shared with private enterprise. A delegated welfare state model exists 
alongside a recentring of control in departments and ministries of finance and executive bodies 
such as the Privy Council Office.
74
 
The adaptability of neoliberalism as economic theory and as social practice is well 
documented.
75
 The period following the economic crisis of 2008 was briefly marked by 
significant infrastructure investments as economy boosting measures, but was swiftly followed 
by a renewed neoliberal economic approach under austerity measures.
76
 Some scholars and 
policy analysts have claimed that austerity measures, brought about by the near-collapse of many 
national economies owing to the deregulation of financial markets and sectors characteristic of 
neoliberalism, are a form of “neoliberalism 3.0.”
77
 Owing to significant budget shortfalls 
stemming from economic malaise, neoliberalism 3.0 or austerity has resulted in cuts in social and 
other spending, particularly for provinces and territories that have responsibility for most social 
programming. The tasks related to providing services, particularly in areas such as social 
assistance and income supports, and child welfare and prevention services, are thus made more 
challenging in such a context. As the FNCFS Program is meant to both comply with provincial 
standards and legislation and is meant to be reasonably comparable to services available off 
reserve, the provincial/territorial climate flavours the AANDC/INAC provision of services. It is 
also subject to its own budgetary regimes. Moreover, until 2015, the federal government 
followed an austerity approach to budgeting and social policy delivery.
78
 Although there was 
significant joint reporting and external assessment of the problems with the FNCFS Program 
beginning in the early 2000s, coupled with the findings of the 1996 Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples and the 2015 Truth and Reconciliation report, the broader institutional and 
bureaucratic political structure retained funding based on formula and population, rather than 
based on needs.
79
 The context of neoliberal managerialism and then austerity also meant that 
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 On delegated social policy, see Kimberly J Morgan & Andrea Louise Campbell, The Delegated Welfare State: 
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Planning A 2037. See also Stephen McBride, “Neoliberalism in Question?” in McBride, Mahon & Boychuk, supra 
note 73, 21.  
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79
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other social services were streamlined and reassessed so the effects of cuts in social spending 
were cumulative, and felt acutely for vulnerable, low income, and marginalized populations.
80
 
Significantly, although with some variation depending on philosophical orientation, provincial 
and federal governments enacting neoliberal practices often reflect neoliberalism’s hostility to 
equity claims.
81
   
The final feature of the neoliberal period that is relevant to the Caring Society decision 
relates to centralized decentralization/delegation. In social policy development and funding, 
especially at the federal level, planning, analysis, and decision-making often occur in a 
centralized and often fragmented, incremental fashion.
82
 David Good notes that: 
 
The focus of redistributive policy making is increasingly central agency (PMO, PCO, 
and Department of Finance) centred and driven as a basis for strategically positioning 
issues, designing programs, and managing political conflict. The Department of 
Finance is undertaking the policy analysis and design, bypassing social departments, 
drawing directly upon pre-selected think tanks and external advisors, and engaging 





This centralization of policy control, often framed in budgetary rather than program specific 
processes, has meant that adjusting policies, particularly their funding levels, is more difficult as 
bureaucrat experts in the area may not be direct participants in planning. Although political will 
matters enormously, twinned with a culture of austerity and accountability, effecting funding and 
policy changes (absent legal compulsion to do so) has been often ineffective.   
The other side of centralization is decentralization.
84
 Decentralization can have salubrious 
and important effects: local delivery of a service by those who know an issue and community, 
and in this case, can provide vital culturally appropriate services. Yet in a context of widespread 
new managerialism and financialization of social policy, this decentralization can make it 
exceptionally challenging to deliver services.
85
 In Caring Society, this is evident in a range of 
areas such as the funding choices that incentivized child removal and a lack of supports for 
compliance, reporting, and auditing requirements. The increase in the number of FNCFS 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, (Ottawa: TRCC, 2015) at 189–90.  
80
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agencies operating on reserves in Canada is essential; the decentralization, however, absent 
coordination among federal departments and with provincial departments, and absent adequate 
funding, resources, support, and infrastructure, shifts the responsibility for service provision to 




The FNCFS Program came into being at the beginning of a process of retrenchment and 
restraint in social policy in Canada. As this process unfolded, its characteristics—managerialism, 
decentralization, financialization, and at times, indifference to issues of social inequality—
informed the struggles for appropriate and adequate funding for child and family welfare on 
reserves. The ubiquity of neoliberal processes in almost all policy portfolios meant that other 
supports such as health care were also subject to such regimes, compounding inequities. I turn 
now to an examination of the interplay between the necessities of life and the social policies that 
touch on the Caring Society decision.  
 
III. INDIGENOUS CHILD WELFARE AND SOCIAL    
REPRODUCTION: TENSIONS AND THRESHOLD EFFECTS 
 
At the outset of this paper, I suggested that Caring Society is fundamentally about how people 
put together and sustain the necessities of life; it concerns a contest over social reproduction. 
What is social reproduction? Like neoliberalism, social reproduction is at times imprecisely 
deployed to reference caring labours. In feminist political economy usage, social reproduction 
refers to the processes and practices involved in maintaining and reproducing people on a daily 
and generational basis.
87
 The ways in which this occurs vary historically and culturally, but 
always involve putting together the necessities of life, including shelter, food, culture, intimacy, 
affection, socialization, and security, among others.
88
 As I have argued elsewhere, social 
reproduction involves:  
 
the day to day work of maintaining and reproducing people and their labour power, 
including creating space for the building of their capacities such as learning, 
caretaking, and playing ... It often involves internalizing and coping with 
discrimination and racism [and] is usually carried out in homes and involves the 
teaching of social norms, which are social assets and which are integral in 
coordinating the activities of an economy ... It involves negotiations over power and 
resources within households, usually between men and women ... It is often 
characterized by an unequal division of labour and a gender-specific socialization 
process. It also includes provisioning beyond individual households, through 
volunteer work, intra-household care work, and local initiatives pertaining to shared 
                                                        
86
 For an insightful review of neoliberalism, shifting responsibilities for services, and the Australian child welfare 
system, see Chris Cunneen, “Surveillance, Stigma, Removal: Indigenous Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice in the 
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social space or services. Social reproduction involves pooled risk services and 
programs, such as getting access to income via citizenship-based entitlements such as 
those which have been provided through the welfare state ... In short, social 
reproduction encompasses the work that must be done in order to ensure that people 





Social reproduction is thus dynamic and is in tension, in capitalist economies, with the aim of 
profit maximization.
90
 It requires mediation at a number of levels, especially by states, families 
and households, and to different extents, markets.
91
 States, for example, can take on some of the 
mediation by underwriting certain costs and supports, such as health care. These costs and 
supports can also be left to markets to provide for a price, to the third sector to provide as 
charity, or they can be shifted to families (and usually women within them) to provide via their 
own labours. The latter is usually the cheapest way for these costs and services to be met, often 
through a discourse of obligation and care. Yet such mediation requires the creation and 
stabilization of class, gender, and racialized orders; neoliberal capitalism, and in the case under 
review, white settler neocolonialized versions which follow ready conduits of inequality in 
assigning social reproduction and its corollary order. The familiar version of the post-Fordist 
compact is an easy illustration of a short-lived entente between regimes of capital accumulation 
and social reproduction.
92
 In this post-war compromise, capital accepted limits on profit 
accumulation in exchange for a labour accord held broadly in place by a rigid gender accord in 
which almost exclusively white men aspired to, though did not always achieve, a family wage. 
This compact consolidated a division of labour in the work of social reproduction done in homes, 
although it was significantly bolstered by an emergent Keynesian welfare state that underwrote 
certain processes and tasks. These class, gender, and racialized orders required mediation and to 
different extents repression, whether in the form of direct suppression and state violence, in the 
form of legal structures that denied access to reproductive freedom, or in the over-incarceration, 
denial of services to and/or surveillance of poor or racialized groups.
93
 In the case of Indigenous 
peoples in Canada, it took racist expression in, among other things, residential schools whose 
ostensible aim was to resocialize children into white settler culture and to destroy the capacities 
for social reproduction in communities. 
The work of social reproduction requires material inputs. These can come from multiple 
sources including wages, subsistence, rent, income transfers from governments, gifts and charity, 
barter, and more indirect pooled risk transfers and credits such as tax credits or childcare 
subsidies. These inputs are transformed, often via women’s labour, into material necessities and 
goods. But it also requires affective, social, and cultural inputs.
94
 States play a significant role in 
establishing the conditions under which social reproduction, including its social and cultural 
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 They do this via their roles in regulating capital, labour markets, social 
policy and welfare state entitlements, and in enforcing obligations within families.
96
 The work of 
social reproduction is thus often rendered invisible; we tend to recognize and name it when it 
fails: a child taken into care, generational cycles of abuse, violence and incarceration, and youth 
suicide among others. Failure to invest in households and families reveals threshold effects on 
care economies, and is often expressed in higher spending in corrections. Beyond paying for in 
the justice system what might be more wisely invested in social services, crises in social 
reproduction ripple beyond the micro household experience of depletion. As Elson argues in 
relation to macroeconomic policy, the domestic, the economic, and the political are 
interconnected and rely on one another:  
 
We have identified three sectors: the domestic, the private and the public; and three 
circuits: the market, the tax-and-benefit circuit and the communications network. We 
have argued that the domestic sector produces a labour force; and, more than that, 
plays a foundational role in the production of people who possess not only the 
capacity to work but also to acquire other more intangible social assets—a sense of 
ethical behaviour, a sense of citizenship, a sense of what it is to communicate—all of 
which permit the forming and sustaining of social norms. We have argued that, 
without these intangible social assets, the three circuits could not function with any 




The lens of social reproduction, particularly when it is applied in concert with an understanding 
of neoliberalization, brings important clarity to Caring Society. Three intertwined aspects merit 
closer consideration. First, federalism is in this case an expression of social reproduction and can 
be viewed as producing a kind of constitutionally derived havoc. Second, a crisis of care, 
including related to fiduciary duties, animates this case. Here, funding levels, discrimination, and 
new managerial bureaucratic practices extend the risk and effects of a loss of cultural, affective, 
and familial social reproduction. Finally, a lack of coordination among departments and 
ministries as expressed most starkly in Jordan’s Principle compartmentalizes and can deny 
substantive tools to enable positive social reproduction.  
It is easy to forget, in the abstractions of policy and funding directives, discussions of 
forms of capital accumulation and regulation, and theoretical abstractions of social reproduction 
theory, that the case under consideration is principally about children, families, and their 
wellbeing.
98
 Rae argues that: 
 
Research has found that poverty, poor housing and parental substance abuse—far 




 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore in detail the critiques of family forms in feminist political economy 
and social work literatures. I note here, however, that the normative family forms associated with much social policy 
in the field of child welfare does not often accord with ideas of kinship and care found in many Indigenous and 
immigrant belief structures.  
97
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more than physical or sexual abuse—are the top three reasons First Nation families 
enter the child welfare system. These structural issues go far beyond child protection 
programming, and touch on the drivers of poverty including lack of education, the 
federal funding cuts to housing and infrastructure on reserve, and the weak 
availability of high quality and appropriate health and cultural services to help 




These structural issues are principally the creatures of provinces. Scholars such as Barbara 
Cameron have made a case for understanding the constitutional divisions of responsibilities in 
sections 91 and 92 within a framework of social reproduction.
100
 She traces the ways in which 
assigning responsibilities for economic development powers to the federal government and those 
related to private matters, or “local works and undertakings,”
101
 to provinces created a 
framework in which the messy work of caring for people evolved into being a kind of division of 
social reproduction. She notes that the “1867 division of power assigned ‘Indians and lands 
reserved for Indians’ to the federal government, a power that it has exercised historically to 
destroy the material basis for the social reproduction of Aboriginal peoples.”
102
 Returning to 
children and families, the evolution of this original constitutional framework nests the bulk of 
welfare state architecture—health care, education, childcare, child welfare, housing, and so on—
with provinces. Labour and environmental regulations are also part of a broad social 
reproduction frame.
103
 The conditions, inputs into, and regulation of social reproduction, where 
taken up by states, is often carried out at the provincial level. Provinces, one scholar of 
multilevel governance notes, “have women” because they have social services; this is equally so 
for children and families.
104
 
The messiness of the Caring Society decision reflects a contest over social reproduction, 
where the provinces “have” children and families jurisdictionally and legislatively, but the 
federal government circumscribes the inputs into the funding and quality of that support. In an 
inversion of other policy areas, the federal government here “has” social reproduction. The 2009 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts reflected on this problem: 
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it should be possible to compare the level of funding provided to First Nations child 
and family services to similar provincial agencies, and given their unique and 
challenging circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect First Nations agencies to 
receive a higher level of funding. Yet, when asked how the funding for First Nations 
child and family service agencies compares to agencies for non-natives, the Assistant 
Deputy Minister said, “I'm sorry, but we don't know the answer.” The same question 
was put to the Deputy Minister and he replied, “Our accountability is for the services 




This constitutional arrangement, a kind of race-to-the-bottom approach that shifts responsibility 
for substantiveness and culpability for inadequacies, provincializes and familializes social 
reproduction. Such bureaucratic reasoning, coupled with a neoliberal devolutionary 
managerialism, frustrates and evades equality claims. Failing to meaningfully invest in 
prevention and household infrastructures (including their affective, material, and cultural 
capacities) encourages crises of care. This jurisdictional contest over social reproduction led the 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts to reflect: “Quite frankly, one has to ask why a program 
goes on for 20 years, the world changes around it, and yet the formula stays the same, 
preventative services aren’t funded, and all these children are being put into care.”
106
 
The fiduciary and possibly Haida Nation duty
107
 owed to Indigenous people stemming 
from a sui generis relationship is here squarely related to multi-generational interests; beyond 
language and cultural transmission, Caring Society forms part of a conversation about a need for 
disproportionate culturally appropriate resource investment and control over social reproduction 
in First Nations communities on reserve. Such investment is multilayered, and requires a broad 
conception of inputs into social reproduction to address the structural and historical basis of 
crises in social reproduction. “We believe,” the Auditor General of Canada noted in 2011, “that 
there have been structural impediments to improvement in living conditions on First Nations 
reserves.”
108
 “Real improvement,” they continued:  
 
… will depend on clarity about services levels, a legislative base for programs, 
commensurate statutory funding instead of reliance on policy and contribution 
agreements, and organizations that support service delivery by First Nations. All four 





The profiles of First Nations families differ dramatically to non-First Nations families, and while 
not enforceable, the conclusions of the Tribunal acknowledge that disproportionate need is best 
tied to disproportionate and coordinated investments in supports for social reproduction.
110
 This 
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 Blackstock et al, supra note 20 at 15. See also Caring Society, supra note 2 in which the Tribunal noted that:  
the provinces’ legislation and standards dictate that all alternatives measures should be explored 
before bringing a child into care, which is consistent with sound social work practice as described 
earlier. However, by covering maintenance expenses at cost and providing insufficient fixed budgets 
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is most starkly articulated in the jurisdictional disputes over funding and services seen in the 
narrow application of Jordan’s Principle.  
The lens of social reproduction reveals the ways in which crises of care are mediated, 
taken up, and delegated. Combined with an understanding of neoliberal approaches and 
practices, it illuminates the shifting of costs, responsibility, and blame among levels of 
government, to local communities and agencies, and to families. This lens has the potential to 
alter a legal lens that must answer questions of equality and discrimination to one that also asks 
how Indigenous interests and equity are best served. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: RECOGNITION, REDRESS, AND 
RECONCILIATION? MOVING BEYOND CRISES IN CARE  
 
Among the most important elements of Caring Society is its confirmation both that children and 
families on reserve have been discriminated against in the provision of child and family services 
(recognition of harm) and that redress is also material: increased and coordinated funding. It 
acknowledged that there may be a fiduciary duty owed in cases of discrimination and inequality, 
with implications for cases and situations well outside of land based claims. The decision 
anchored historical practices including residential schools and the sixties scoop, along with 
consistently documented under-resourcing of social and infrastructure services, to the current 
crisis tendencies in social reproduction on many reserves. The escalation of these crisis 
tendencies can be traced in part to neoliberal logics in policy formation and in a discursive frame 
that individualizes blame for structural social problems. Culturally appropriate service provision 
on the part of First Nations agencies is critical to addressing some of the most egregious features 
of the FNCFS Program; yet such control cannot resolve the features of miscoordination, funding 
shortfalls, and paternalism that stem from AANDC/INAC, and to some extent provincial, 
practices. Federalism, neoliberal governance, and social reproduction are thus central to this 
case.  
Caring Society suffers from a range of lingering questions, confusions and implementation 
struggles, and delays.
111
 The Tribunal missed an opportunity to affirm a systemic remedy that 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
for prevention, AANDC [INAC]’s funding formulas provide an incentive to remove children from 
their homes as a first resort rather than as a last resort. For some FNCFS Agencies, especially those 
under Directive 20-1, their level of funding makes it difficult if not impossible to provide prevention 
and least disruptive measures. Even under the EPFA, where separate funding is provided for 
prevention, the formula does not provide adjustments for increasing costs over time for such things as 
salaries, benefits, capital expenditures, cost of living, and travel. This makes it difficult for FNCFS 
Agencies to attract and retain staff and, generally, to keep up with provincial requirements. Where the 
assumptions built into the applicable funding formulas in terms of children in care, families in need 
and population levels are not reflective of the actual needs of the First Nation community, there is 
even less of a possibility for FNCFS Agencies to keep pace with provincial operational requirements 
that may include … costs for legal or band representation, insurance premiums, and changes to 
provincial/territorial service standards (ibid at para 344). 
111
 I return to the question of tribunal versus court and wonder while there is no guarantee that a court hearing the 
case would provide greater guidance, the stringency of the section 15 and section 1 tests would give full airing to 
both legislative/administrative aims and scope, as well as breadth and legacy of discrimination. Additionally, I am 
cognizant that the Court’s “version of reconciliation is formed from the litigation process in a Canadian court system 
imposed on Indigenous peoples, which uses colonial precepts and terminology that precludes genuine 
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might touch on some of the inputs into social reproduction, such as the remedy delivered in CN v 
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) (Action Travail).
112
 The Action Travail case 
addressed the need for disproportionate investments based on need, and socioeconomic and 
historical impact: 
 
the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ruled Canadian National Railway Co. (CNR) 
had discriminated against women in its hiring practices for certain types of front line 
railway positions (so-called ‘blue-collar’ jobs), otherwise thought to be the work of 
men. As part of a comprehensive remedial order, the Tribunal required at least one-
in-four new employees hired by CNR for ‘blue-collar’ positions be filled by a 
woman until the overall employment rate at CNR reached thirteen percent – the 
national percentage at the time of women working in equivalent jobs elsewhere. The 




Such an approach, nested in disproportionate investment to remedy historical inequalities, in 
concert with an eye to a self-governing solution for the myriad issues plaguing areas beyond 
child welfare and service coordination within INAC’s jurisdiction, could have a broad and 
salutary reconciliatory reach.  
The Tribunal’s assessment of discrimination is one that underscores the need for a 
nuanced legislative, policy, and legal approach to social reproduction as a lens to build a 
reconciliation culture. Investing in the conditions that not only allow people to survive but to 
thrive is a social and forward-looking process. The changes required by the Tribunal of 
AANDC/INAC are significant, but its scope is necessarily narrowly construed and thus cannot 
substantively address the amalgam of inputs into the conditions for social reproduction. The 
latter requires considered legislative and political will, good will, and an openness to a kind of 
rebuilding of comprehensive policies that may well give greater space for autonomy over social 
policy remedies and practices. Unique relationships require new solutions that do not deplete 
existing capacities, but that meet the aim of supporting children and their families so that they 
might have childhoods from which they do not need to recover.
114
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